Using detailed origination and performance data on a comprehensive sample of CMBS deals, along with their underlying loans and a set of similarly rated residential MBS, we apply reduced-form and structural modeling strategies to test for regulatorycapital arbitrage and ratings inflation in the CMBS market. We find that the spread between AAA CMBS yields and AAA corporate bond yields fell significantly following a loosening of capital requirements for highly rated CMBS in 2002, while no comparable drop occurred for lower-rated bonds (which experienced no similar regulatory change). We also find that AA-rated CMBS upgraded to AAA significantly faster than comparable AA-rated residential RMBS (for which there was also no change in risk-based capital requirements). We use a structural model to investigate these results in more detail, and find that little else changed in the CMBS market over this period except for the rating agencies' subordination levels.
Introduction
The rating agencies have taken a large share of the blame for the recent financial crisis.
1 For example, Tomlinson and Evans (2007) , in an early Bloomberg report on the subprime crisis, quote Satyajit Das, a former banker at Citigroup:
"The models are fine. But they have an input problem. It becomes a number we pluck out of the air. They could be wrong, and the ratings could be misleading."
The same report quotes Brian McManus, head of CDO Research at Wachovia: "With CDOs, they underestimated the volatility of the subprime asset class in determining how much leverage was OK."
Before concluding that the rating agencies were to blame, however, it is important to control for the many other factors affecting these markets. For example, it is well documented that there was a significant drop in the quality of residential mortgages in the years preceding the financial crisis, especially in the subprime sector, fueled both by lower underwriting standards and by dishonesty on the part of borrowers and lenders.
2 Many have also blamed problems in the credit default swap (CDS) market.
3 Given all of these confounding factors, "One FDIC review of 4,000 Long Beach loans in 2003, found that less than a quarter could be properly sold to investors. A 2005 review of loans from two of Washington Mutual's top producing retail loan officers found fraud in 58% of the loans coming from one loan officer's operations and 83% from the other. Yet those two loan officers continued working for the bank for three years, receiving prizes for their loan production. A 2008 review found that staff in another top loan producer's office had been literally manufacturing borrower information to speed up production." "Documents obtained by the Subcommittee also show that, at a critical time, Washington Mutual selected loans for its securities because they were likely to default, and failed to disclose that fact to investors. It also included loans that had been identified as containing fraudulent borrower information, again without alerting investors when the fraud was discovered. An internal 2008 report found that lax controls had allowed loans that had been identified as fraudulent to be sold to investors." it has proved hard to extract the separate role of the rating agencies in the recent crisis, despite the wealth of anecdotal evidence, and there has so far been little empirical work on this question in the academic literature.
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Another, related, factor often blamed for the financial crisis is regulatory-capital arbitrage (RCA), defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) as "the ability of banks to arbitrage their regulatory capital requirement and exploit divergences between true economic risk and risk measured under the [Basel Capital] Accord."
5 For example, Acharya and Richardson (2010, p. 197) state, "But especially from 2003 to 2007, the main purpose of securitization was not to share risks with investors, but to make an end run around capital-adequacy regulations. The net result was to keep the risk concentrated in the financial institutions-and, indeed, to keep the risk at a greatly magnified level, because of the overleveraging that it allowed." 6 Opp, Opp, and Harris (2010) argue that, especially for complex securities, regulatory distortions like this can reduce or eliminate the incentive for rating agencies to acquire information, in turn leading to rating inflation. In this paper, we shed new light on the role of the rating agencies and regulatory-capital arbitrage in the crisis by focusing on the commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) market. 7 There are several reasons why the CMBS market is ideal for this purpose. First, we have access to large amounts of detailed origination and performance data on the CMBS tranches and the loans underlying them. Second, unlike the residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) market, all agents in the CMBS market can reasonably be viewed as sophisticated, informed investors; 8 as a result, we need to look for explanations other than investor naïveté 4 Notable exceptions include Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2009) , who study credit ratings in the residential mortgage-backed security market, and Griffin and Tang (2009) , who look at CDO ratings.
5 For detailed discussions of regulatory-capital arbitrage, see, for example, Jones (2000) , Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999), Altman and Saunders (2001) , Alexander and Baptista (2006) , Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) , Acharya and Richardson (2010) , and Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter (2010) . 6 The International Monetary Fund (2008, p. 31) reported that aggregate assets held by the ten largest publicly traded banks in the United States and Europe grew between Q2:2004 and Q2:2007 from about 8.7 to 15 trillion euros. Over the same period risk-weighted assets, which determine the capital requirements of these institutions, grew significantly less, from 3.9 to about 5 trillion euros. 7 Prior to the recent financial crisis, the U.S. CMBS market had expanded rapidly, with an average annual growth rate of 18% from 1997 to 2007, at which point it stood second only to commercial banks as a source of credit to the commercial real estate sector. By the end of the third quarter of 2007, outstanding CMBS funded $637.2 billion, commercial banks $1,186.2 billion, and insurance companies $246.2 billion of the total $2.41 trillion of outstanding commercial mortgages [see Federal Reserve Z.1 Release (Flow of Funds), Third Quarter 2007].
8 By 2007 more than 90% of all outstanding CMBS was held by the insurance companies (50.1%), the mutual funds (25.3%), the commercial banks (9%), and the GSEs (6%)). Over 90% of all commercial bank holdings of CMBS was concentrated in the balance sheets of twelve banks who received TARP funds, including: Citigroup; J.P. or irrationality. Third, as we shall show (and also unlike the RMBS market), there were no major changes in the underlying market for commercial loans over this period. Finally, in the years prior to the crisis there were significant regulatory changes in the CMBS market, which greatly increased incentives for institutions to hold highly rated CMBS; this provides a perfect experimental setting in which to test for the effects of regulatory-capital arbitrage.
In our analysis, we use both reduced-form and structural modeling approaches. The reduced-form approach (see, for example, Mian and Sufi, 2009) is a natural way to analyze the effects of recent changes in regulations that affected highly rated CMBS securities, but not either lower-rated CMBS or other defaultable securities of any rating. We find that the difference between AAA CMBS yields and AAA corporate bond yields fell significantly in the years after 2002, when risk-based capital requirements for highly rated CMBS were lowered greatly. No comparable drop in relative yields occurred for lower-rated bonds (which experienced no similar regulatory change). In addition, in the years prior to the crisis, the rate at which AA-rated CMBS upgraded to AAA was significantly higher than the rate observed in a comparable sample of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), for which there was no change in risk-based capital requirements in 2002.
Because many of the contract terms are endogenous, we need to be careful in interpreting the results of any analysis that focuses only on a single contract feature. We therefore complement our reduced-form analysis with a structural model that examines all of the loan features at once. We find that in the period leading up to the crisis, the rating agencies allowed subordination levels to fall to levels that provided insufficient protection to supposedly "safe" tranches.
9 While we shall be studying this in more detail later, prima facie evidence is provided by Figure 1 , which shows how subordination levels fell between 1996 and 2007 (with a slight rise in 2008) for all classes of CMBS bonds.
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Of course, there are many possible interpretations of this result. Perhaps (as commonly asserted prior to 2007), in the early days of CMBS issuance, the rating agencies were too conservative, and they updated their views as they saw realized losses.
11 Or perhaps the 9 The subordination level is the maximum amount of principal loss on the underlying mortgage that can occur without a given security suffering any loss.
10 The apparent rise in the subordination level for "AAA above AJ" bonds is illusory. Prior to 2004, the rating agencies reported the level of subordination underlying all of the AAA securities. From 2004 on, it became standard practice to re-tranche the overall principal balance of the AAA securities into an AAA waterfall with senior and junior AAA rated bonds. This caused an apparent increase in the subordination levels of the most senior (and usually shortest duration) of the AAA bonds, because their reported subordination included the balances of the subordinate AAA bonds. However, the principal allocation to the senior AAA bond (labeled "AAA above AJ") is not comparable to the AAA support in prior periods. The series labeled "All AAA" shows the subordination underlying the first dollar of AAA bonds, is consistent with the pre-2004 definition, and shows the same decline up to 2007 seen for the other ratings.
11 See, for example, Wheeler (2001 , it became standard practice to retranche the overall principal balance of the AAA securities into senior and junior AAA-rated bonds. This caused an apparent increase in the subordination levels of the most senior (and usually shortest duration) of the AAA bonds (labeled "AAA above AJ"), because their reported subordination included the balances of the subordinate AAA bonds. However, this reported subordination level is not comparable to the AAA support in prior periods. The series labeled "All AAA," showing the subordination underlying the first dollar of AAA bonds, is consistent with the pre-2004 definition. The data were obtained from Trepp LLC. loans themselves were changing over time in a way that made the CMBS bonds safer for a given subordination level. To conclude that subordination levels were too low by the beginning of the crisis, we need to rule out such alternative explanations. To do so, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the CMBS market both before and after the crisis, using a number of different data sets. We use the Trepp LLC loan-level, bond-level, and pool-level performance data from 1995-2010. We also use bond-level performance data for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), obtained from Lewtan ABSNet. The bondlevel performance was used to track the relative upgrade history of RMBS bonds compared with the upgrade history of CMBS bonds. Overall, our study accounts for the performance of 582 CMBS pools and 9,732 RMBS pools. We find that, unlike the RMBS market, CMBS loans did not significantly change their characteristics during this period. Moreover, CMBS lenders did not significantly change the way they priced a given loan. The only significant change during this period was the enormous reductions in subordination levels required by the rating agencies to qualify a bond for a given credit rating. Indeed, had the 2005 vintage CMBS used the subordination levels from 2000, there would have been no losses to the senior bonds in most CMBS structures.
This decrease in subordination levels (with corresponding increase in the proportion of AAA-rated CMBS), unaccompanied by any change in the quality of the underlying loans, is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Opp, Opp, and Harris (2010) . They argue that, especially for complex securities, regulatory distortions (in this case, the reduction in risk-based capital weights for AAA-rated CMBS compared with lower-rated whole loans) can reduce or eliminate the incentive for rating agencies to acquire information, in turn leading to rating inflation. These incentives were particularly strong in the CMBS market because of explicit regulatory changes in the years leading up to the crisis. Specifically, on January 2, 2002, the risk-based capital weights for AAA CMBS were reduced by 80%. We show that this dramatic regulatory shift was associated with a substantial decrease in the yields of AAA CMBS relative to yields of AAA corporate bonds (with no similar change for lower-rated bonds), and a large increase in the overall proportion of CMBS rated AAA-by 2007, about 93% of all outstanding CMBS were rated AAA, compared with 83% just nine years earlier.
We also show that between 2000 (when the regulatory shift in CMBS ratings was formulated and approved by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the U.S. Congress (see Federal Reserve and SEC, 1998) ) and 2006, the rate at which AA rated CMBS bonds were upgraded to AAA ratings far exceeded the corresponding upgrade rates for RMBS.
These significant upgrade and pricing differentials of CMBS bonds compared with similarly rated corporate and RMBS bonds are difficult to explain based on market-wide shifts in risk perceptions. They are, however, entirely consistent with the increased risk-based capital savings to regulated institutions (the primary investors in CMBS bonds) leading to significant distortions in the stock of these bonds, the capital support underlying them, and the prices that regulated institutions were willing to pay.
Related literature
The empirical papers most closely related to ours are Griffin and Tang (2009) , Ashcraft et al. (2009), and Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) . Griffin and Tang (2009) analyze the outputs of a rating agency's credit model for a sample of CDOs between 1997 and 2007. They find that the actual size of the AAA tranche in each deal was almost always larger than the model suggested, by an average of over 12% but in many cases much more. They are unable to explain these adjustments using variables related to default risk, and find that the average size of the adjustments increased in the years up to 2007. These results, using data from different (though related) markets, are a good complement to ours. In particular, while Griffin and Tang (2009) have direct access to a rating agency's model (which we do not), we have access to much more detailed information on the loans underlying our bonds. In both cases, the conclusion is the same: the only thing that materially changed over this period was the rating agencies' allowable subordination levels. Ashcraft et al. (2009) analyze the validity of agencies' ratings of sub-prime and Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) between 2001 and 2007. They find important declines in risk-adjusted RMBS subordination between 2005 and mid-2007 and observably riskier deals significantly under-performed relative to their initial subordination levels. Ashcraft et al. (2009) conclude that their findings are consistent with two theoretical predictions found in the literature: i. ratings inflation could be associated with increased security opacity (proxied by the degree of no-documentation loans in pools) and ii. the benefits of a fee-based revenue model and high rates of security issuance could swamp the reputational costs of erroneous ratings (see Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009 for the first prediction, and Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2009; Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet, 2009 for the second). The use of both loan-level and bond-level data in our study is similar to the strategy implemented by Ashcraft et al. (2009) . However, an important difference between the two studies is that we find no evidence that the CMBS market was exposed to the confounding effects of significantly deteriorating and/or fraudulent mortgage underwriting practices that affected the RMBS market over the same period. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) find that 70.7% of the dollar amount of CDOs received a AAA rating, whereas the collateral that supported these issues had average credit ratings of B+. They hypothesize, but do not empirically test, that the CDO subordination structure was driven by rating-dependent regulation and asymmetric information. Similar to these findings, we find that the commercial real estate loans in the CMBS pools would typically have received a credit rating of BBB or below, whereas the level of AAA CMBS bond issuance reached 88% in 2006.
12
Many recent theoretical treatments of ratings shopping (see, for example, Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009; Bolton et al., 2009 ) assume that investors are naive or easily fooled by the rating agencies' practices of revealing only the highest ratings. The greater sophistication of CMBS investors makes this assumption less tenable. Instead, the CMBS market appears to fit more naturally into informed rational expectations frameworks with regulatory distortions (see, for example, Opp et al., 2010; Coval, Jurek, and Stafford, 2009a; Merton and Perold, 1993; Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and Spatt, 2009 ).
CMBS ratings and regulatory-capital arbitrage
In their fully rational model, Opp, Opp, and Harris (2010) show that large regulatory benefits of high ratings may serve to eliminate delegated information acquisition by rating agencies, in turn leading to significant rating inflation. This outcome is more likely with more complex securities. The CMBS market is a useful place to examine this idea, because a significant regulatory shift occurred in 2002. Since that time, very generous risk-based capital weights have applied to AAA and other highly rated CMBS, compared with the weights that apply to the underlying whole loans and to lower-rated CMBS.
The left-hand side of Table 1 reports the risk-based capital (RBC) requirements for CMBS held by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-regulated financial institutions. Prior to July 2, 2002 (as shown in the bottom-left panel of the table), all investment-grade CMBS and most commercial real estate mortgages received a risk weight of 100%, implying that a $1 investment in CMBS required the institution to hold $.08 of capital ($1 × 100% × 8%).
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After 2001 (as shown in the upper-left panel), whole commercial real estate mortgages and BBB-rated CMBS retained a 100% risk weight, whereas all AAA and AA-rated CMBS fell to a 20% risk-weight, requiring only 1.6 cents of capital per dollar of investment. An A-rated CMBS received a 50% risk-weight, requiring 4 cents of capital per dollar of investment, and 12 See The Structured Credit Handbook, New York, John Wiley, 2007. This information was also obtained from discussions with CMBS servicers.
13 Additionally, 50% of that capital would be expected to be Tier 1 capital. Tier 1 capital includes common stock, undivided profits, paid-in-surplus, non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries minus all intangible assets (with limited exceptions), identified losses, and deferred tax assets in excess of certain limits.
BBB-rated CMBS received a 100% risk weight. Although not shown in the table, BB-rated CMBS carried a risk-weight of 200%, or 16 cents of capital for every dollar of investment. B-rated and unrated CMBS bonds required the financial institution to hold capital equal to 100% of the face amount of the bond.
The right-hand side of Table 1 shows that the RBC weights for life insurance companies regulated by state insurance commissioners were also modified over the same period. Prior to 2001, all AAA, AA, and A bonds (including CMBS) used a factor of 0.3%, requiring $0.003 of capital per $1 of Adjusted Carrying Value (ACV) of the investment, whereas BBB-rated CMBS required $0.01 per $1 of the ACV of the investment.
14 Non-investment grade BB-rated bonds had a factor of 4.0%. Unsecuritized commercial real estate mortgages were required on average to use a factor of 2.25% or $0.0225 per $1 of investment. After 2001, all the risk-based capital factors for life insurance companies rose slightly, however, the overall ACVs fell. Thus overall capital costs fell slightly for AAA, AA, and A-rated CMBS bonds, whereas the average factor for unsecuritized commercial real estate mortgages held in insurance company portfolios rose to 2.6%.
There are a number of factors that make the risk-based capital percentages of the banks and the insurance companies hard to compare directly.
15 Nevertheless, we can conclude from Table 1 , that that the RBC requirements for holding unsecuritized investment-grade commercial real estate mortgages on bank balance sheets were 5 times as high as for AAA CMBS after 2001, and were 6.5 times as high for insurance companies after 2000. Prior to the regulatory change in 2001, banks would have been indifferent between holding whole commercial loans or investment grade CMBS, whereas after the regulatory shift, investment-grade CMBS required significantly less capital. Insurance companies also faced strong incentives to hold CMBS in preference to unsecuritized commercial real estate mortgages given the important differentials in risk-based capital requirements between CMBS and loans. Table 2 reports an estimate of the potential savings in risk-based capital from holding the equivalent of the book value of AAA-CMBS as commercial real estate mortgages. The AAA-CMBS holdings of the insurance companies were obtained from Alberto Manconi, Massimo Massa, and Ayako Yasuda, and the AAA-CMBS holdings of commercial banks were 14 The Adjusted Carrying Value (ACV) is a dynamic model-based determination of the default-riskadjusted value of investments and their required reserves.
15 These factors include: 1) The accounting basis for insurers is statutory accounting; 2) life insurers set up reserves that are separate from the risk-based capital minimum capital requirements (such as Asset Valuation Reserves and reserves for asset/liability analysis); 3) tiering of capital is not done for insurers, as it is for banks, and some types of lower tier capital is not allowed insurers under statutory accounting rules; 4) the insurance factors are based on the default rates of all bonds of a given rating not just CMBS; 5) insurance companies have longer time horizon for holding investments than banks; and 6) there are numerous other differences related to the legal and regulatory environments of the two types of institutions. 
Reduced-form tests for regulatory-capital arbitrage
If regulatory-capital arbitrage is an important force in the CMBS market, we should expect to see prices driven up (or equivalently, spreads driven down) after the rule change in 2002, relative to other markets with no such change. However, we should expect only to see such a change for the higher rated CMBS securities, since they are the ones affected by the rule change. To investigate this, Figure 2 plots the difference (in basis points) between CMBS and corporate bond yields for ratings AAA, BBB and BBB-from 2002 to 2006. Consistent with the implications of our regulatory-capital arbitrage explanation, it can clearly be seen that the relative spread for AAA bonds fell substantially starting in 2002, compared with the relative spread for the lower rated bonds. This result also supports the conjecture of Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009b) that the observed yield spread advantage of AAA-rated CDOs relative to AAA-rated single-name corporate bonds arises from demand stimuli associated with minimum bank capital requirements under Basel I and II.
Another important feature of the CMBS market was that in addition to the reductions in the principal support that underlay the AAA bonds at origination, there were also high rates of upgrading CMBS bonds with lower ratings to AAA ratings. By the fourth quarter of 2006, the combined effect of the low subordination rates at origination and the high rates of upgrading bonds to a AAA rating led to AAA-rated bonds making up 93% of the overall stock of outstanding CMBS principal. This very high proportion of AAA-rated bonds persisted until the third quarter of 2009, when the rate of downgrades overtook the rate of upgrades.
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This increase in the outstanding stock of AAA CMBS is consistent with an increase in regulatory-capital arbitrage induced by the RBC policy change. Of course, the raw increases do not rule out alternative explanations, such as the possibility that a similar increase in AAA ratings also occurred in other markets without a similar change in regulations. To investigate this possibility, we compare the CMBS upgrade behavior over time with the upgrade behavior for the RMBS market using a difference-in-difference regression approach. To run this regression, we track the monthly ratings status for all AA-rated CMBS and RMBS bonds from 1998 to 2009. The data for this analysis were the bond-level and ratings data from Trepp LLC for the CMBS AA-rated bonds and the bond-level and ratings data from Lewtan ABSNet for all AA-rated RMBS bonds.
17 Using a logit framework, we model the monthly probability that each AA-rated bond will be upgraded to AAA. Table 3 reports two alternative specifications, one in which we do not control for the origination vintage of each bond (shown in columns two and three), and a second (shown in columns four and five), in which we control for vintage fixed effects for the bonds to allow for possible changes in the credit quality of the bonds in the years preceding the financial crisis. As shown in Table 3 , there is little differences between the two specifications. The coefficient on the indicator variable for CMBS bonds prior to the changes in the RBC for CMBS in 2001 is not statistically significant in the specification without fixed effects, but becomes statistically significant with vintage fixed effects. However, the regulatory regime change in 2002 leads to a more than two-fold increase in the coefficient's magnitude, implying that upgrades in 2002 greatly exceeded those in 2000. As shown in the table, from 2001 on-i.e., while the CMBS risk-based capital weight policy was vetted and approved by Congress (see Federal Reserve and SEC, 1998) , and after its implementation in 2002-the CMBS bonds showed a significantly greater propensity to be upgraded than the corresponding RMBS bonds. Otherwise the two specifications, one including and the other excluding vintage fixed effects, produce nearly identical results.
Since we are controlling for the initial credit ratings of the bonds, the results of this Table 3 : Logit analysis of the monthly probability of a AA-rated CMBS/RMBS bond upgrading to a AAA-rating. The table reports estimation results for a logit analysis of the AAA-ratings transitions of AA-rated RMBS and CMBS bonds. We track each AA-rated bond every month until it becomes rated AAA, it is paid off, or our analysis period ends (at the end of 2009). The bonds were obtained from 516 CMBS pools and 468,843 RMBS pools originated between 1995 and 2007. The CMBS data are from Trepp LLC and the RMBS data are from ABSNet Lewtan.
analysis are strong evidence that the elevated rates of upgrading AA-rated CMBS bonds to AAA-rated bonds cannot be solely explained by changes in perceptions of the overall risk for AAA-rated bonds. Instead, there appears to be something unique to the likelihood of upgrading AAA-rated CMBS over this period, despite the public knowledge that subordination levels were falling significantly. In addition, as we saw above, despite the large increase in the supply of AAA-rated CMBS, sophisticated investors were willing to pay high prices for these bonds relative to AAA-rated bonds in other markets over this period, while this was not true for lower-rated CMBS. Taken together, these results strongly suggest that both pricing and ratings in the CMBS bond market were responding to the risk-based capital advantages of AAA ratings provided by the ratings agencies starting in 2002.
Structural modeling evidence
We have shown that, consistent with a regulatory-capital arbitrage explanation, spreads for AAA CMBS in excess of AAA corporate bonds decreased significantly, starting in 2002, compared with relative spreads for lower-rated securities. We have also shown that the likelihood of an upgrade from AA to AAA was significantly higher in the CMBS market than in the RMBS market. While this is significant evidence for the importance of regulatorycapital arbitrage, in this section we analyze the CMBS market in more detail to see if there were some other CMBS-specific changes that could have accounted for these results.
Loan quality
It is well documented that there was a significant drop in quality in the residential mortgage market in the years preceding the financial crisis, especially in the subprime sector. Here we analyze whether a similar quality deterioration occurred in the commercial loan market (though, of course, a deterioration in commercial loan quality would suggest that subordination levels ought to have increased, rather than decreased, over time). Table 4 shows summary statistics for the 516 conduit deals originated in the United States between 1995 and 2008 for which we have information on the underlying loans. Overall, these CMBS pools were composed of 51,677 fixed-rate, fully amortizing, commercial realestate loans at origination.
18 The data used to compute these summary statistics were obtained from Trepp LLC. As shown in Table 4 , while there are differences in the loan characteristics from year to year, there are no strong trends over time. The Loan-to-Value 
Pool composition
Even if the quality of individual loans of each type remains the same, it is still possible for the quality of CMBS mortgage pools to change over time if the mixture of loan types in each pool changes. To investigate this possibility, Figure 3 shows the mix of different property types underlying the same 516 CMBS deals. Again, we obtained the data from Trepp LLC. It can be seen that there was a substantial rebalancing of the loan composition of the pools away from multi-family loans and towards office loans. The share of hotel loans also increased over the period from about 10% to 15%. Hotel loans are usually considered riskier loans, due to the volatility of leisure/travel demand, while office are usually considered slightly less risky. Overall, the property concentration does not suggest any significant trends in CMBS default risk.
Loan pricing at origination
While measurable aspects of loan quality, such as LTV and DSCR, did not change materially in the years leading up to the crisis, it is possible that these measures do not fully capture all [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . This figure shows the property-type composition of the universe of 516 CMBS pools that were originated from 1995 to 2008. These pools are composed of 51,677 non-seasoned fixed rate mortgages. The data were obtained from Trepp LLC aspects of the perceived riskiness of the loans. In particular, it is possible that the market's estimates of default probabilities for a given loan changed over the period in a manner that was uncorrelated with LTV and DSCR. This would justify changing subordination levels, but would not necessarily show up as a change in LTV or DSCR values. However, it would show up as a change in pricing (or equivalently, the coupon rate) over time for a loan with given characteristics.
20
We here perform two different analyses to investigate whether commercial real estate loan underwriting standards changed over the pre-crisis period. First, we analyze the composition of the spread between the loan contract rates and the 10-year constant maturity Treasury rates for a large sample of securitized commercial mortgages over this period. Then, since commercial mortgage loan underwriting characteristics are determined jointly, we carry out a second structural modeling analysis, which accounts for the true nonlinear relationship between commercial mortgage contract variables and the embedded options in these contracts. In this analysis, we use the Titman and Torous (1989) two-factor mortgage valuation model to estimate loan-by-loan implied volatilities at origination for the commercial real estate loans in our sample. In this analysis, we would expect that any change in default expectations should translate into an increase or decrease in the embedded implied volatilities in these contracts over time.
Regression analysis
For our empirical analysis of the pre-crisis trends in loan underwriting, we again use the loanlevel sample obtained from Trepp LLC. Our pre-crisis sampling period corresponds to a time period over which CMBS subordination levels experienced dramatic declines, as shown in Figure 1 , and yet it precedes by at least two years generally acknowledged market indicators of the financial crisis (see Tong and Wei, 2008) . Table 5 reports our regression analysis of the pre-crisis components of commercial mortgage contract rate spreads to the ten-year constant maturity Treasure rates at the origination date of each loan. Although all mortgage terms are jointly determined, we find that the loanto-value ratio and the debt-service coverage ratios are highly correlated, so we report two sets of regressions.
21 One set is for spread as a function of loan characteristics, excluding DSCR, but including property type and loan-origination year dummies for 1996-2008. As shown, although all of the year dummies are different from zero, there is no obvious trend in the dummies over time other than that spreads in 2003 and 2004 were closer to the benchmark 20 Moreover, even if everyone's expectations were wrong, the story about rating agencies becoming less conservative in their default estimates over time would be more reasonable if other market participants were also becoming less conservative.
21 A regression of LTV on DSCR and no intercept has an R 2 of .80.
2005 spreads than those in prior years. These results suggest that although subordination levels were changing over this period, lenders were not significantly changing the way they priced the underlying loans.
Implied volatilities
In the model of Titman and Torous (1989) , the value of a mortgage, M , is a function of interest rates, r, and property prices, p, which evolve together as:
The implied volatility of a newly issued mortgage is defined as the volatility which sets the value of a newly issued mortgage equal to par. Details of the estimation procedure and of the loan characteristics are provided in Appendix A. Table 6 reports summary statistics for the time series of estimated loan-level implied volatilities. Office and industrial properties exhibit the highest implied volatilities, at 21.48% and 20.62%, respectively. For retail properties, the average implied volatility is 18.84%, and for multifamily properties it is 17.05%. Although these volatilities are higher than the values that appeared in the early literature, they are consistent with some more recent estimates, including Stanton and Wallace (2009) and Korteweg and Sørensen (2011) . 
Ex ante default expectations
Despite observable loan characteristics remaining roughly constant, implied volatilities on newly issued commercial loans did show some decline during the period 1995-2008, indicating some improvement in credit quality. Directionally, at least, this is consistent with a reduction in subordination levels over time. To understand whether the size of the reduction 22 Much of the early literature predates the development of the modern CMBS market. Titman and Torous (1989) apply a two factor model using quoted mortgage contract rates (as opposed to transaction rates) from 1985 -1987 . Ciochetti and Vandell (1999 and Holland, Ott, and Riddiough (2000) both calculate implied volatilities from one-factor mortgage valuation models, using mortgage origination data from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s. Table 6 : Implied Volatilities by Property Type. The table presents the computed implied volatilities for our sample of loans. The implied volatility is defined for each loan as the value of φ p in Equation (5) that sets the initial value of the loan equal to par.
Spread
in subordination levels makes sense in light of the observed reduction in implied volatilities, we here combine the subordination levels with a statistical model for defaults over time to ask what future defaults could reasonably have been expected at the time the CMBS were issued. We model the distribution of defaults over time using the Titman and Torous (1989) model described above, inserting our property-specific implied volatilities from Section 5.3 into the property price evolution described by Equation (2). Details are provided in Appendix B. Figure 5 shows the distribution of cumulative default rates, calculated using our implied volatility measures. The solid line indicates the median cumulative default rate across the simulations, the dashed lines show the approximate location of the 25 th and 75 th percentiles, and the dotted lines show the 5 th and 95 th percentiles, respectively. As can be seen, for approximately the first two years from origination, there are virtually no defaults, consistent with the fact that, by and large, the simulated loans carry low LTV levels. However, starting around year two, defaults begin to ramp up, and by the end of the 10-year horizon, the median cumulative default rate is 17%, with an interquartile range from 11% to 25%. An interesting feature of the cumulative default rates shown in Figure 5 is the up-tick in cumulative default at the maturity date of the loans. Since, on average, conduit loans amortize over a thirty horizon but are due at the end of ten years, there is usually a large remaining principal balance that is due at the maturity date. Thus, the amortization structure of these loans exposes investors to elevated risk of default that is concentrated at their maturity dates. Figure 6 shows the corresponding distribution of realized cumulative loss rates. The losses track the default rates closely. Again, there are almost no losses during the first two years, but then losses start to increase. By the end of the 10-year horizon, the median cumulative loss rate is 7.0%, with an interquartile range from 4% to 10.5%.
To assess the adequacy of CMBS subordination levels, we can compare our simulated loss rates with the subordination levels observed in practice, which are shown in Table 7 . (6) and (7), keeping track of the first time that each mortgage defaults along a simulated path of interest rates and property returns. (6) and (7), keeping track of the first time that each mortgage defaults along a simulated path of interest rates and property returns. Figure 5 , all of these values are well below the median ten-year loss rate generated by our model.
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Comparison with historical default experience
The results above strongly suggest that subordination levels in the years immediately prior to the recent crisis were too low (or equivalently, that they implied expected default levels on supposedly "safe" bonds that were too high). To confirm the reasonableness of the model's predictions, we compare them with historical CMBS default experience analyzed by Esaki (2002) using a panel of 116,595 commercial real estate loans held by major insurance companies. The default rate of these loans between 1972 and 1990 never fell below 10% and at times exceeded 30%. While default rates fell substantially between 1990 and 1996 (during the operation of the Resolution Trust Corporation and establishment of CMBS auctions to liquidate the holdings of failed S&L institutions), the long-run average default rate for these commercial loan portfolios from 1972 to 1996 was around 20%, very close to the model's predictions.
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All of our conclusions above about ex ante default likelihoods and subordination levels thus apply equally well to observed default levels from 1972-1990 as they do to our modelimplied default rates, and we are forced to conclude that subordination levels of CMBS issued in the years immediately prior to the crisis were too low. As a benchmark for comparison, according to Moody's, the 10-year cumulative default rate on BBB-rated corporate bonds is approximately five percent (see Moody's, 2006) . The simulation results shown in Figure 5 indicate that this rate of cumulative defaults is exceeded 95 times out of 100.
23 Capitalization rates used to value commercial real estate declined significantly from 2000-2005. To the extent that these rates were lower than fundamentals would support, loan-to-value ratios effectively increased over time, making true default and loss expectations even higher than our estimates.
24 While we do not have direct evidence about how CMBS loans compare with commercial mortgages held by insurance companies, insurance companies held on average about 43% of the stock of CMBS between 1998 and 2009 (see Lipper EMAXX institutional bond holdings database) and their investments in the stock of commercial whole mortgages fell from about 23% to about 10% from 1995-2009, while the commercial mortgage holdings of the CMBS market rose to about 23% of the stock of commercial real estate lending over the same period (see various issues of the Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States). Thus the insurance industry behaved as if their CMBS investments were appropriate substitutes for the whole commercial mortgages that they held on their balance sheets prior to 1995. Table 7 : Subordination rates. The table shows weighted-average subordination levels (equivalently, the maximum principal loss that can be sustained without affecting a given security) for the universe of CMBS securities with different ratings originated between 2004 and 2007. The subordination structure for these pools was obtained from CMAlert (http://www.CMAlert.com/).
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Conclusions
By studying the CMBS market, we shed new light on the role of the rating agencies and subordination levels in the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] . While the rating agencies have been blamed by many for over-optimistic ratings, it has been hard to pin down their role unambiguously due to the presence of many other confounding factors. We show that almost all of these confounding factors are absent in the CMBS market. In particular, unlike with residential loans, commercial loans did not significantly change their characteristics during this period, and commercial lenders did not change the way they priced a loan with given characteristics. Moreover, during the crisis, while commercial loans bore their share of defaults, realized defaults were in line with levels observed over almost the whole of the 40-year period before the crisis, excluding the most recent few years. We find that both before and during the crisis, the only significant shift in the market was the reduction in allowable subordination levels by the rating agencies. This is consistent with ratings-capital arbitrage, following the loosening of risk-based capital requirements for highly rated CMBS in 2002. This loosening introduced significant incentives for insurers and banks to hold AAA-rated CMBS, providing an explanation for both the trends in subordination and for the patterns we uncovered in spreads and upgrade behavior in the CMBS market relative to other markets that did not experience a similar regulatory change, This is also consistent with general evidence provided in Acharya and Richardson (2010) and Acharya et al. (2010) that regulatory-capital arbitrage fundamentally drove bank and insurance company investment strategies prior to the financial crisis, and that these strategies served to greatly increase the leverage of these firms and their susceptibility to insolvency with even minor shocks to fundamentals.
A Calculating implied volatilities
As when using option prices to infer implied volatility for an equity option, calculating implied volatilities for commercial mortgages requires a mortgage pricing model. We use a two-factor model based on Titman and Torous (1989) , in which the value of a mortgage, M , is a function of interest rates, r, property prices, p, and time, t.
Interest rates Interest rates are governed by the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) model,
where κ is the rate of reversion to the long-run mean, θ r , and φ r governs interest rate volatility. The price of interest rate risk is determined by the product ηr t . We estimate parameters for the interest rate process using the methodology of Pearson and Sun (1989) and daily data on constant maturity 3-month and 10-year Treasury rates from 1968 to 2006:
Property prices Property prices follow the risk-neutral geometric Brownian motion process, dp
where q p is the net income as a fraction of market value and φ p is the volatility of the property's return. We estimate q p using realized income returns, obtained from NCREIF, between the first quarter of 1978 and the first quarter of 2005, leading to estimates (close to those used in Titman and Torous, 1989) of:
where E [dW r dW p ] = ρ dt, subject to boundary conditions is similar to those described in detail in Titman and Torous (1989) , though with one significant difference. Based on results from Brown, Ciochetti, and Riddiough (2006) , we assume that, in the event of a default, the underlying real estate suffers an immediate additional drop in value of 24.4%. This does not affect the borrower's default decision, but does affect the lender's loss in the event of a default (and hence also affects implied volatilities).
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We assume that ρ = 0, and solve the model numerically, using a finite difference method to value the security, simultaneously determining the critical default boundary. The implied volatility for a given mortgage is then determined (also numerically) by finding the value of φ p at which the model prices a newly issued mortgage (from the perspective of the lender) at par.
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B Simulating defaults
To simulate defaults, we use the Titman and Torous (1989) model described above, inserting our property-specific implied volatilities from Section 5.3 into the property price evolution described by Equation (2). Before doing this, however, it is necessary to model the correlation between defaults on different loans in a pool. 25 We could add other features to the model, such as borrower default costs or stochastic volatility. While this might change implied volatilities, the effect on default and loss rates would be small because we are using the same model to estimate both implied volatilities and default rates. With deadweight costs of default, for example, then at the previously estimated implied volatilities, the model would now yield initial mortgage values well above par (because default rates would now be lower than before). To bring prices back down to par again, implied volatilities would have to increase above their prior values, in turn resulting in an offsetting increase in default probabilities. This is very similar to a point noted by Huang and Huang (2003) , who calibrated a variety of different credit-risk models to historical default rates and found that "[D]ifferent structural models . . . predict fairly similar credit spreads under empirically reasonable parameter choices." In both cases, prices are primarily driven by default rates, so even quite different-looking models will tend to agree on default (loss) rates if they agree on prices, and vice versa.
26 Errors in fitting the term structure over time represent a potential source of bias in our implied volatilities. However, these errors will generally be small because, in calculating the implied volatilities, we make sure to match the ten-year Treasury rate exactly. To the extent that errors at other points on the yield curve have some small effect, the resulting bias in implied volatilities could be either positive or negative, depending on whether the model-implied term structure is too high or too low.
Correlation between loans While the correlation between mortgages in a pool does not affect the total value of all CMBS tranches, it does affect the relative values of different tranches.
27 In general, more dispersion (more correlation) lowers the value of safer tranches, and increases the value of extremely risky tranches. 28 The tranches most adversely affected by greater dispersion of mortgage default would be not the AAA securities (which are protected even if defaults are substantially higher than expected), but the securities slightly lower down in priority, such as BBB. In estimating default expectations, it is therefore important to take correlation between individual mortgages into account. To do this, we split the return shocks for each property into two components, a common component shared across all properties, and a property-specific component, whose volatility varies by property type. More precisely, we simulate draws from the following system:
dp j i,t = (θ 
where p j i,t is the price of property i, of type j (where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 indexes apartment, office, retail, industrial, and all other properties, respectively), dW t is common across all properties, and dW i t is an independent shock for each property. We use the total return volatility published by the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) as an estimate of the systematic component, 7.019%. We then set the idiosyncratic volatility for each property type to match the total volatilities given in Table 6 . For example, the idiosyncratic volatility for office properties is set to φ p i =0.203, implying a total volatility for office properties of √ 0.07019 2 + 0.203 2 = 0.215, the relevant value in Table 6 .
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27 Ignoring spreads and liquidity differences, the total CMBS cash flow equals the total mortgage cash flow, and the value of each mortgage does not depend on correlation. Thus, in particular, changes in correlation cannot cause subordination levels on all bonds to shrink at the same time.
28 The dependence on dispersion (correlation) arises because tranching makes CMBS payoffs nonlinear in the default rates of the underlying mortgages. Hence, by Jensen's Inequality, the expected cash flow to a CMBS is not equal to its cash flow at the expected default rate on the underlying mortgages, the difference depending on the volatility of the cash flows. As an example, suppose that a CMBS structure protected against losses up to 10%, and the expected loss on the mortgages was 10%. If the default rate were certain, then the CMBS would experience a 0% default rate. If the default rate were uncertain, and, say, had a fifty percent chance of a 0% or 20% default realization, the CMBS would have an expected loss of 5% of underlying principal.
29 The common shock to property returns induces default correlation. The NCREIF data include appraisals, which may introduce some smoothing, in turn resulting in underestimating systematic volatility (and hence default correlation). Increasing correlation would lower the diversification obtained through pooling the loans, increasing the dispersion of defaults and losses. Hence, while the mean default rate would stay constant, both very high and very low default rates would become more likely.
Simulation Details To estimate the default behavior of pools of mortgages, we first create a simulated pool, containing 100 mortgages, with types chosen to match the average proportions seen in the data: 25 apartment, 20 office, 30 retail, 10 industrial, and 15 "other" (proxied by national averages). For each mortgage, we randomly draw an LTV so that we match the sample mean and standard deviation of the origination LTV ratios for the property's type. Within each property type, though the mortgages differ in their initial LTV ratio, they share the sample average coupon level, term, and amortization schedule.
Given the composition of the pool, we now make 5,000 draws from the system of equations (6) and (7), keeping track of the frequency with which the joint interest rate and property price process moves into the region where each borrower optimally chooses to default both over the term of the mortgage and at maturity.
30 For the net drift of the house price process, we use the average inflation rate over the last 20 years, 2.5%, following a large literature that has found long-run real growth in land and real-estate prices to be approximately zero (see, for example, Hoyt, 1933; Mills, 1969; Edel and Sclar, 1975; Eicholtz, 1997; Wheaton, Baranski, and Templeton, 2009 ). In the event of a default, we also keep track of the realized loss to the lender. 30 The default boundary for each loan is determined as part of the numerical solution of the pricing p.d.e.
